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although liberty is a recurring concern in machiavelli’s writings, there is no 
consensus regarding either the definition of the concept or its relevance 
for his overall political thought. One direction of Machiavellian inter-
pretation that has gained prominence in recent decades has focused 
on the concept of “libertas” in relation to a republican mode of govern-
ment, even though Machiavelli’s use of liberty cannot be simply equated 
with republicanism.1 In tracing the various occurrences of the term 
in Machiavelli’s political works, Marcia Colish has pointed out that in 
the context of internal affairs “Machiavelli often connects libertà with 
certain personal rights and community benefits that characterize free 
states regardless of their constitutions.” She specifies, in fact, that “he 
clearly identifies freedom with the protection of private rights” (1971, 
345–6).2
Following up on Colish’s findings, this essay focuses on liberty 
in The Prince and The Discourses as it relates to freedom from govern-
ment infringement on one’s person and rightful property. The the-
oretical backing for this approach can be found in Murray N. Roth-
bard’s understanding of freedom as “a condition in which a person’s 
ownership rights in his own body and his legitimate material prop-
erty are not invaded, are not aggressed against” (2011, 50; emphasis 
in the original). In this definition, “the invasion of another’s person 
or property” occurs through “the use or threat of physical violence” 
(Rothbard 1982, 223).3 I also suggest that Machiavelli’s considerations 
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of personal liberty in opposition to state power have relevance for our 
contemporary political milieu. 
In The Discourses Machiavelli posits two theoretical scenarios for 
the origin of cities: voluntary internal accord and external aggression.4 
Considering Venice as an example of the first, he explains that “with-
out any particular person or prince to give them a constitution,” those 
who reached the site that would become Venice “began to live as a 
community under laws which seemed to them appropriate for their 
maintenance” (Discourses 1.1, 101). In the second scenario, a foreign 
predatory group (genti forestiere) takes over a territory and builds a city 
that is not free and that consequently does not have the same chance 
to achieve greatness.5 This latter case, Machiavelli points out, corre-
sponds to the origin of Florence under the Roman empire. 
When Machiavelli composed The Prince, Florence had recently 
been taken over once again. In September 1512 the Medici faction 
seized power when the threat of invasion by a Spanish army—fresh 
from its sack of nearby Prato—led to a coup in the city.6 Nor does 
it appear there was any scope for freedom under the new regime. 
Machiavelli, following his dismissal, was barred from Palazzo Vecchio, 
prohibited from travelling beyond the boundaries of Florentine terri-
tory for one year, and ordered to pay a bond of a thousand florins. He 
was subsequently arrested on a charge of conspiracy against the state 
and subjected to physical and mental torture.7 Although he was inno-
cent of the charges, only the election of a Medici as pope in March of 
1513 brought an end to his imprisonment as part of a general amnesty. 
If prudence consists, as Machiavelli maintained, “in being able 
to assess the nature of the particular threat and in accepting the lesser 
evil” (The Prince xxi, 73), what would be considered the “lesser evil” if 
someone who valued liberty were to offer advice to a prince in power? 
His objective would have to be—to borrow Rothbard’s phrasing—“to 
confine any existing State to as small a degree of invasion of person and 
property as possible” (1982, 193).8 And this, I would argue, is exactly 
what we find in The Prince, albeit presented as precepts designed to 
help the ruler retain power.9 Given the reality of both local predators 
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and foreign invaders with huge armies at their disposal, Machiavelli 
was not offering a utopian vision of how the world should be, but 
proposing measures that could safeguard some level of freedom from 
aggression by political power. Let us first address two of Machiavelli’s 
recommendations that would directly counter the prince’s predatory 
tendencies with respect to the population: to restrain taxation and to 
respect people’s property. 
Through taxation the state deprives its subjects of the fruits 
of their labors. Not surprisingly, as Lauro Martines notes in his clas-
sic Power and Imagination: City-States in Renaissance Italy, “nothing stirred 
the public passions of citizens more deeply than taxes” (1988, 110). As 
he explains in a later publication: “The great expenses of government 
were for armies and wars; but the dowries, jeweled objects, costly 
hangings, cloth of gold, and objets d’art of princes were also paid for 
out of taxes—namely, out of varieties of indirect levies that lay heavi-
est on petty merchants, artisans, small farmers, and the rural poor” 
(1998, 195). Thus court intellectuals who routinely treated a ruler’s 
magnificence as virtue were actually encouraging a situation in which 
“the structures of public finance . . . petted the wealthy and burdened 
the humble” (1998, 198).
When in The Prince Machiavelli alerts the reader that he will re-
examine traditional vices and virtues as he seeks the “real truth” (ver-
ità effettuale) of things, the very first definition he overturns is that of 
liberality (liberalitate) and miserliness (parsimonia). Working against the 
celebration of magnificence in the “Mirror for Princes” genre popular 
at the time, Machiavelli exposes a prince’s so-called generosity as noth-
ing other than robbing from the entire population in order to shower 
lavish gifts on a privileged elite. Although a ruler who avoids this com-
mon practice will initially be called stingy (misero), he will eventually 
be recognized as the only one worthy of the label of liberality since 
in time “he proves himself generous to all those from whom he takes 
nothing, and they are innumerable, and miserly towards all those to 
whom he gives nothing, and they are few” (The Prince xvi, 52).10 Machia-
velli’s advice on the matter is unambiguous: “So a prince must think 
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little of it, if he incurs the name of miser, so as not to rob his subjects, 
to be able to defend himself, not to become poor and despicable, not to 
be forced to grow rapacious” (xvi, 52).
Although Machiavelli does not directly bring up the issue of 
taxation with respect to Federigo da Montefeltro, William R. Albury 
points out that “Federigo da Montefeltro and his father . . . were able 
to maintain their popularity with their subjects because their income 
from military condotte allowed them to tax their subjects at a relatively 
low rate” (2014). Thus, Machiavelli’s assertion that the people of Ur-
bino loved their duke may not be unrelated to the fact that he financed 
the construction and decoration of his palaces and patronized the arts 
through his military income and not through high taxation.
Similarly, in The Discourses, Machiavelli singles out for praise a 
system of taxation that he attributes to free German cities: when the 
authorities decide they require funding for a public project, they impose 
a property tax of 1 or 2 percent. Each person, after taking an oath to 
pay the appropriate sum, “throws into a chest provided for the purpose 
the amount which he conscientiously thinks that he ought to pay; but 
of this payment there is no witness save the man who pays” (Discours-
es 1.55, 244–5). The example is purportedly meant to demonstrate the 
goodness of a people who merit such trust, but it likewise posits a sce-
nario in which the authorities can request only as much as the inhabit-
ants will voluntarily contribute without any supervision. The scenario is 
one of popular consent rather than authoritarian coercion.
Regarding the issue of property, both ancient Roman law and 
canon law protected private property from invasion on the part of the 
state.11 In the reality of medieval and Renaissance Italy, however, pri-
vate property rights were routinely trampled upon by those in power: 
“Political defeat and forfeiture of property were joined like the two 
sides of a coin. The new signore won supporters and loyalty by doling 
out the houses and lands of the defeated, or by selling these to adher-
ents for derisory sums” (Martines 1988, 100). Indeed, it may be the 
ruling factions’ proverbial disregard for private property rights that 
prompts Machiavelli’s insistence that the prince keep his hands off the 
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people’s property. Not only will the prince always avoid being hated 
“if he abstains from the property of his subjects and citizens and from 
their women” (The Prince xvii, 54–5), but he will actually gain their 
favor: “As long as he does not rob the great majority of their property 
or their honor, they remain content” (The Prince xix, 58–9). In order to 
hammer home this point to any prince reluctant to take his advice se-
riously, Machiavelli again warns that “above all a prince must abstain 
from the property of others; because men sooner forget the death of 
their father than the loss of their patrimony” (The Prince xvii, 55). This 
jarring assertion, rather than a cynical statement about a lack of filial 
piety, is a dramatic way to caution the prince that men will never forget 
the confiscation of their property.12 The comparison, moreover, sets up 
his culminating point that princes have a great temptation to grab prop-
erty precisely because it is so easy to invent an excuse: “It is always pos-
sible to find pretexts for confiscating someone’s property; and a prince 
who starts to live by rapine always finds pretexts for seizing what be-
longs to others. On the other hand, pretexts for executing someone are 
harder to find and they are sooner gone” (The Prince xvii, 55).
The most extreme form of aggression on private property is that 
upon one’s own person, negating the most basic right of self-owner-
ship. In The Discourses, for example, uprooting men from their land 
is considered an act so horrendous that it is metaphorically equated 
with treating humans like animals. Commenting that Philip of Mace-
don “moved men from province to province as shepherds move their 
sheep,” Machiavelli remarks that this inhuman cruelty goes against 
universal law: “Such methods are exceedingly cruel, and are repug-
nant to any community, not only to a Christian one, but to any com-
posed of men.”  Indeed, in an uncompromising espousal of ethics over 
exigency, Machiavelli declares that not even the power of kingship 
can justify infringing upon human freedom in this way: “It behooves, 
therefore, every man to shun them, and to prefer rather to live as a 
private citizen than as a king with such ruination of men to his score” 
(Discourses 1.26, 177). 
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While rightful property owners must be free from aggression, 
this does not pertain to idle titleholders who are said to continually 
aggress against the peasants who are engaged in working the land. 
In The Discourses, Machiavelli pointedly condemns the unproductive 
gentlemen (gentiluomini) “who live in idleness on the abundant reve-
nue derived from their estates, without having anything to do either 
with their cultivation or with other forms of labor essential to life.”13 
The underlying assumption is that the idle gentry (or their ancestors) 
gained their property through violent expropriation or illegitimate 
privilege, not through rightful means of acquisition; indeed, such ex-
ploitation was widespread in the Italian peninsula. Milan’s feudal no-
bility, for example, preferred to live under a signore, “expecting to ben-
efit from his government,” and gained their wealth by living “off lands 
[as well as] off paid military activity, sinecures, church posts, castella-
nies, and public offices” (Martines 1988, 96). It is clear that Machiavelli 
is critiquing a system of exploitation and not the wealthy per se when 
he contrasts this group with the “gentlemen” (gentiluomini) of Venice: 
“Their great wealth is based on merchandise and movable goods. More-
over, none of them have castles, nor have they any jurisdiction over 
men” (Discourses 1.55, 247–8). He thus distinguishes unearned wealth 
enabled by political power from wealth legitimately earned through 
one’s own labor, whether through production or commerce.
Machiavelli imagines, moreover, how a condition of entitlement 
can be set into place ex nihilo through sheer political and military force: 
Where considerable equality prevails, no one who proposes 
to set up a kingdom or principality, will ever be able to do it 
unless from that equality he selects many of the more am-
bitious and restless minds and makes of them gentry in fact 
and not in name, by giving them castles and possessions 
and making of them a privileged class with respect both 
to property and subjects; so that around him will be those 
with whose support he may maintain himself in power, and 
whose ambitions, thanks to him, may be realized. As to the 
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rest they will be compelled to bear a yoke which nothing 
but force will ever be able to make them endure. (Discourses 
1.55, 247)
In this scenario, political power both creates and feeds off of a system 
of privilege and parasitism. Citing Marc Bloch’s seminal Feudal Society, 
Rothbard defines feudalism as “the seizure of land by conquest and the 
continuing assertion and enforcement of ownership over that land and 
the extraction of rent from peasants continuing to till the soil” (1982, 
67n). In agreement with Locke’s ideas on the origin of rightful property 
ownership, Rothbard states: “It should be clear that here, just as in the 
case of slavery, we have a case of continuing aggression against the true 
owners—the true possessors—of the land, the tillers, or peasants, by the 
illegitimate owner, the man whose original and continuing claim to the 
land and its fruits has come from coercion and violence” (1982, 65).14 
Feudalism is thus one of the classic ways in which “the State provides a 
legal, orderly, systematic channel for predation on the property of the 
producers; it makes certain, secure, and relatively ‘peaceful’ the lifeline 
of the parasitic caste in society” (Rothbard 2011, 62). 
I would contend, moreover, that Machiavelli goes beyond the 
specific issues related to taxation and private property to dissuade the 
prince from intervening in civil society (il vivere civile) more generally 
as well. During this period, it was not uncommon to find collusion 
between political and economic forces in society. Renaissance princes 
“pledged mining and trade monopolies” (Martines 1998, 195), while 
privileged families were “concerned about controlling the political 
situation in order to profit from the monti (public funds), to be able to 
obtain reductions on taxes and forced loans, to establish international 
relationships of privilege, or even to set up monopolies via official mis-
sions and with the backing of popes and kings” (Branca 1999, xi). The 
Medici family was particularly notorious for using political power for 
economic advantage (and vice versa). Tim Parks revisits one glaring 
and disastrous example of this practice in which, following a deal with 
Pope Paul II and the King of Naples, the Medici family had a total 
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monopoly over all sales of the vital mineral alum throughout Chris-
tendom even though monopolies were illegal under Church law.15 To 
protect his interests, Lorenzo de’ Medici sent an army to Volterra that 
sacked, raped, and massacred the town’s inhabitants when a conflict 
arose between a mining consortium and that town’s ruling faction 
(Parks 2005, 201–3).16
In contrast to the various forms of state corporatism operat-
ing in his day and continuing in our own, Machiavelli separates eco-
nomic endeavors from political activity. As he wrote in a letter to his 
friend Francesco Vettori, “Fortune has seen to it that, since I do not 
know how to talk about either the silk or the wool trade, or profits or 
losses, I have to talk about the state” (Najemy 1993, 225). In pointing 
to his own limitations, Machiavelli is also envisioning economics and 
politics as two independent spheres, each requiring a different kind 
of expertise.17 In fact, in his political writing, he makes a point to as-
sert that civil society can best flourish in the absence of government 
intrusion.18 In The Discourses he states that the common utility (comune 
utilità) of a free state (vivere libero) is “the possibility of enjoying what 
one has, freely and without incurring suspicion . . . , the assurance 
that one’s wife and children will be respected, [and] the absence of fear 
for oneself” (Discourses 1.16, 154). Machiavelli returns to this point in 
a later passage, linking freedom to the prosperity that ensues when a 
man has children in the confidence that he “can rear them and feels 
sure that his patrimony will not be taken away.” Indeed, in such a 
society, he muses, one’s children could even become rulers (principi) 
through their virtue (virtù) (Discourses 2.2, 280). 
Machiavelli goes on to maintain that the right to acquire and 
own property through production and commerce benefits the entire 
community: “One observes, too, how riches multiply and abound 
there, alike those that come from agriculture and those that are pro-
duced by the trades. For everybody is eager to acquire such things and 
to obtain property, provided he be convinced that he will enjoy it when 
it has been acquired. It thus comes about that, in competition one with 
the other, men look both to their own advantage and to that of the 
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public; so that in both respects wonderful progress is made” (Discourses 
2.2, 280). In other words, those who acquire wealth through their la-
bor will continually exchange with other producers and merchants, 
leading to greater overall prosperity. Characteristically, he goes on to 
offer the opposing scenario as well: “The contrary of this happens in 
countries that live in servitude; and the harder the servitude the more 
does the well-being to which they are accustomed, dwindle.” That is, 
when the state intervenes to hinder economic activity or confiscate 
rightfully earned profits, producers will logically be discouraged from 
working, resulting in diminished production and a loss of well-being. 
Here we can see that although Machiavelli professed ignorance of eco-
nomics in his letter, he is nevertheless able to describe the basic prin-
ciples and advantages of a free-market economy.
Machiavelli’s correlation between property rights protection 
and general prosperity, whether or not it can be said to anticipate 
Adam Smith’s invisible hand or Friedrich Hayek’s spontaneous order, 
is corroborated by global studies undertaken by contemporary organi-
zations such as the Fraser Institute in Canada and the Heritage Foun-
dation in the United States. Noting that “the absence of property rights 
protection is a major cause of world poverty,” Thomas DiLorenzo cites 
a number of annual economic freedom indices which “show a strong 
correlation between the degree of economic freedom in a country and 
economic growth” (2004, 19, 24–7).19 
As Colish points out, Machiavelli includes monarchies, along 
with republics, among those states capable of internal freedom when 
“he advises those who want to set up a new and free polity (uno vi-
vere nuovo e libero), whether it be a republic or a monarchy (o per via di 
republica o di regno), to preserve some of its ancient customs” (1971, 
337; Discourses 1.25). In relating freedom to a new regime’s noninter-
ference with a people’s ancient customs, Machiavelli is distinguishing 
between the voluntary interactions of people and the institution of 
force. Although the concepts of “society” and “state” are sometimes 
confused or intentionally merged in our current discourse, Albert Jay 
Nock shows that the opposition between “social power” and “state 
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power” is an essential one: “Every assumption of State power, whether 
by gift or seizure, leaves society with so much less power; there is 
never, nor can be, any strengthening of State power without a corre-
sponding and roughly equivalent depletion of social power” (2009, 4). 
Randolph Bourne expresses the contrast in a similar way: “Our idea of 
Country concerns itself with the nonpolitical aspects of a people, its 
way of living, its personal traits, its literature and art, its character-
istic attitudes toward life” while State is “armed power, culminating 
in a single head, bent on one primary object, the reducing to subjec-
tion, to unconditional and unqualified loyalty of all the people of a 
certain territory” (1998, 41, 28). Robert Nesbit reminds us, moreover, 
that prior to the onset of the nation-state in Europe, the division be-
tween political regimes and networks of social groups with their own 
established customs, traditions, and authorities, was more clearly de-
lineated (2010, 69–89). Machiavelli not only underscores the distinc-
tion in the passage cited above, but presupposes that an autonomously 
functioning civil society can be harmed to a greater or lesser extent by 
state interference.
If the prince is, therefore, to leave the daily business of civil 
society to proceed unimpeded, how should he spend his time? His 
task, according to Machiavelli, is to busy himself with military exer-
cises: “He must always be out hunting, so accustoming his body to 
hardships and also learning some practical geography” (The Prince xiv, 
47–8). Machiavelli maintains, moreover, that in time of war the prince 
must “assume personal command and captain his troops himself” (The 
Prince xii, 41). Thus, while recent Italian history had provided numer-
ous examples of condottieri becoming rulers through force, Machiavelli 
envisions the prince’s main occupation as none other than that of the 
condottiere, defending the territory he has “acquired” against attacks 
by outside aggressors.20 One might wonder what would happen if the 
requirement to captain the troops were imposed upon today’s political 
leaders—might this discourage them from waging war arbitrarily at 
the expense of their own people?
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A ruler could expect to face threats to his sovereignty from both 
foreign invasion and domestic conspiracy. To avoid the latter danger, 
a political treatise on statecraft sometimes compared to The Prince, the 
ancient Indian Artha Shastra (c. 350–283 BCE), strongly advises an ex-
tensive and complex network of spying. Rather than advocate a surveil-
lance state, however, Machiavelli asserts that a prince can adequately 
guard against conspiracies “if he avoids being hated or scorned and 
keeps the people satisfied” (The Prince xix, 59). Machiavelli may have 
imagined the prince reluctant to absorb this simple lesson since he 
underscores it again: “One of the most powerful safeguards a prince 
can have against conspiracies is to avoid being hated by the populace.” 
And just in case the prince were really obtuse, he presents both sce-
narios with their consequences: “I conclude, therefore, that when a 
prince has the goodwill of the people he must not worry about con-
spiracies; but when the people are hostile and regard him with hatred 
he must go in fear of everything and everyone” (The Prince xix, 60–1). 
This strategy does not stem from the fact that surveillance measures 
were lacking in early sixteenth-century Italy. Although Machiavelli 
could probably not have imagined the widespread invasive surveil-
lance techniques used by governments today, he would have no doubt 
been aware that spying was a common practice in his time. Rulers not 
only employed professional spies, but also relied on secret viewing and 
listening devices designed by contemporary architects (Albury 2014).
The essence of Machiavelli’s advice on conspiracies carries 
over into his discussion of fortresses. The military control exercised 
by signorial government “was often represented by a fortress with-
in the urban space, especially in subject cities” (Martines 1988, 108). 
Machiavelli puts into question the usefulness of fortresses, even dis-
solving the physical structure into a metaphor when declaring that 
“the best fortress that exists is to avoid being hated by the people” 
(The Prince xx, 70). By way of example, he cites Duke Guidobaldo of 
Urbino who, “after he returned to the dominion from which Cesare 
Borgia had chased him, razed to the ground all the fortresses in his 
province, in the belief that by doing so it would be more difficult for 
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him to lose the state again” (The Prince xx, 70). When asserting that “in 
our own time, there is no instance of a fortress proving its worth to 
any ruler,” Machiavelli initially makes an exception for the countess of 
Forlì. Nevertheless, he then goes on to recount how Cesare Borgia was 
ultimately successful in taking over Forlì despite its fortresses because 
the countess’s own subjects had grown hostile to her. Having thus in-
validated his only exception, he concludes as though stating the obvi-
ous: “It would have been safer for her to have avoided the enmity of 
the people than to have had fortresses.”21
Yet Machiavelli would not only take fortresses away from the 
ruler, he would arm the population as well. This is contrary to the 
established praxis of princes throughout history. Discussing the rise 
of professional armies beginning in the second half of the fourteenth 
century, Martines notes that “governments were anxiously concerned 
to keep arms out of the homes and hands of citizens. Once citizens 
were disarmed, most cities could be held militarily by a few score 
knights and several hundred crossbowmen” (1988, 108).22 Machiavelli 
proclaims, to the contrary, that “no new prince has ever at any time 
disarmed his subjects; rather, when he has found them unarmed he 
has always given them arms” (The Prince xx, 67). His reasoning is sim-
ple: “Those who were suspect become loyal, and those who were loyal 
not only remain so but are changed from being merely your subjects 
to being your partisans.” He then moves from the carrot to the stick 
to drive home the point: “But as soon as you disarm your subjects you 
start to offend them, showing whether through cowardice or suspi-
cion that you mistrust them; and on either score hatred is aroused 
against you” (The Prince xx, 68). 
It is telling that Machiavelli’s most important piece of advice on 
how the prince should protect himself from both internal conspiracies 
and foreign invasion was exactly the same: to not be hated by the peo-
ple. And lest the prince forget what will make him hated, Machiavelli 
reiterates: “He will be hated above all if, as I said, he is rapacious and 
aggressive with regard to the property and the women of his subjects” 
(The Prince xix, 58–9). 
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While acknowledging that the Roman emperors were less con-
cerned about the hatred of the people as long as they had the support 
of the military, Machiavelli warns that presently the situation is ex-
actly the reverse because now the people have greater power, at least 
in Europe: “In our own times it is necessary for all rulers, except the 
Turk and the Sultan, to conciliate the people rather than the soldiers, 
because the people are the more powerful” (The Prince xix, 66). None-
theless, he singles out a number of “extremely cruel and rapacious” 
(crudelissimi e rapacissimi) emperors who met an “unhappy end” (triste 
fine) and concludes by stating that “the downfall of the emperors . . . 
was caused by either hatred or scorn” (The Prince xix, 63, 66–7). This 
implicit warning that a ruler retains his power only by consent may 
be a ploy to restrain the predatory impulses of the prince, yet it is also 
an insight that would be eloquently expressed a few decades later in 
France by Etienne de la Boétie: 
The more tyrants pillage, the more they crave, the more 
they ruin and destroy; the more one yields to them, and 
obeys them, by that much do they become mightier and 
more formidable, the readier to annihilate and destroy. But 
if not one thing is yielded to them, if, without any violence 
they are simply not obeyed, they become naked and undone 
and as nothing, just as, when the root receives no nourish-
ment, the branch withers and dies (2008, 45). 
Therefore, despite declarations of power or threats of violence, those in 
power cannot rule if the governed remove their consent. 
The success of both monarchical and republican governments 
is dependent in large part upon just laws, which result in the happi-
ness of the people and consequently in the stability of the regime in 
power.23 And paramount among just laws are those designed for the 
protection of liberty. Indeed, Machiavelli offers the following recipe 
for freedom in a principality: “[The prince] will find that a small sec-
tion of the populace desires to be free in order to obtain authority over 
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others, but that the vast bulk of those who demand freedom, desire 
but to live in security. . . . As for [the latter group], who demand but to 
live in security, they can easily be satisfied by introducing such institu-
tions and laws as shall, in conjunction with the power of the prince, 
make for the security of the public as a whole” (Discourses 1.16, 156). 
Liberty is so essential in a state and yet so continually under threat 
that Machiavelli calls for legally instituted “guardians of liberty.” In 
outlining their jurisdiction, moreover, he specifies that they should 
have the authority to indict “such citizens as have committed any of-
fense prejudicial to the freedom of the state” (Discourses 1.7, 124). No 
enemy of liberty, regardless of his position, would be exempt from 
such prosecution (see McCormick 2011 for an elaboration of how this 
process might be instituted in modern democracy). 
Republics are generally compared favorably to principalities 
and even referred to as “free states.” Nonetheless, when explaining 
why they can sometimes be less free than principalities, Machiavelli 
describes them as a parasitic institution feeding off of civil society: 
Of all forms of servitude, too, that is the hardest which sub-
jects you to a republic. First because it is more lasting, and 
there is no hope of escape; secondly because the aim of a 
republic is to deprive all other corporations of their vitality 
and to weaken them, to the end that its own body corporate 
may increase. A prince who makes you his subject, does not 
do this unless he be a barbarian who devastates the coun-
try and destroys all that man has done for civilization, as 
oriental princes do. On the contrary, if his institutions be 
humane and he behave constitutionally, he will more often 
than not be equally fond of all the cities that are subject to 
him, and will leave them in possession of all their trades 
and all their ancient institutions (Discourses 2.2, 280–1). 
Similarly, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, in arguing that “the deterioration 
of liberty is a structural feature of constitutional republics,” offers 
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a comparison of monarchical and democratic rule that echoes and 
further develops Machiavelli’s comment. While considering both forms 
of government as deficient systems, Hoppe notes that the monarch 
nevertheless has a greater incentive to care for “his” state: “If the 
government is privately owned (under monarchical rule), the incen-
tive structure facing the ruler is such that it is in his self-interest to 
be relatively farsighted and to engage only in moderate taxation and 
warfare” (2001, 39).24 Publicly owned governments, according to Hoppe, 
are not subject to the same incentives and controls. On the contrary, 
since the democratic ruler owns the current use of resources, but not 
their capital value, public-government ownership results in continual 
capital consumption. Moreover, since “anyone, in theory, can become a 
member of the ruling class[,] the distinction between the rulers and the 
ruled is blurred [and] resistance against government power is systemati-
cally weakened” (2001, 25–6). Accordingly, “democratic republicanism 
has led to permanently rising taxes, debts, and public employment” as 
well as “a systematic increase in the intensity and extension of govern-
ment power” (2001, 42 and 24).25
John McCormick has likewise asserted that “electoral democ-
racies appear to permit and perhaps even encourage political and 
economic elites to enrich themselves at the public’s expense and en-
croach upon the liberty of ordinary citizens” (2011, vii ). Yet whereas 
McCormick emphasizes class division based on wealth, I would draw 
attention instead to the basic distinction between the power elite and 
the ruled, that is, between those who, in Franz Oppenheimer’s words, 
satisfy their desires by “political means” or “the unrequited appropria-
tion of the labor of others” and the rest of the population, who live by 
labor and exchange (2012, 24–7; for a bibliographical outline of power 
elite analysis, especially in relation to United States history, see Burris 
2012). 
Although Machiavelli offers advice to both would-be princes 
and rulers of republics, his vision of the political state is fundamen-
tally distrustful and pessimistic. In outlining six forms of government 
in The Discourses, Machiavelli maintains that the principality, aristoc-
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racy, and democracy (Principato, Ottimati, and Popolare), while good in 
themselves, are all ultimately “pernicious” (perniziosi) and pestiferous 
(pestiferi) because of the ease with which they degenerate into the three 
“very bad” (pessimi) forms of government: tyranny, oligarchy, and li-
centiousness (tirannico, di pochi, and licenzioso), respectively. And as 
Machiavelli immediately warns, 
if anyone who is organizing a commonwealth sets up one of 
the three first forms of government, he sets up what will last 
but for a while, since there are no means whereby to prevent 
it passing into its contrary, on account of the likeness which 
in such a case virtue has to vice (Discourses 1.2, 106).26
Indeed, the likeness between the good and bad version of each form of 
government is such that it is not always possible for the reader to guess 
which is under discussion, especially with regard to principalities and 
tyrannies. Although Machiavelli consistently uses the term “prince” 
rather than “tyrant,” the unadorned portrait of the principe that emerges 
from the pages of his works is that of a rapacious predator. This view is 
captured perhaps most strikingly in a simile—which he attributes to 
King Ferdinand of Naples—likening men to “certain little birds of prey in 
whom so strong is the desire to catch the prey which nature incites them 
to pursue, that they do not notice another and a greater bird of prey 
which hovers over them ready to pounce and kill” (Discourses 1.40, 216). 
The historical moment evoked by the mentioning of the Neapolitan king, 
who lost his reign with the French invasion of 1494, would be that of the 
little Italian princes who, while intent on capturing each other’s terri-
tory, were blind to the danger posed by powerful European monarchs. In 
this context, the rulers are distinguished not by their qualities, since all 
are equally predatory, but by the extent of their power. 
In The Golden Ass, Machiavelli openly laments that “the power-
ful with their power are never sated” (5.38–9; 762). The result is both 
dire and inevitable: “This appetite destroys our states, and the greater 
wonder is that all recognize this transgression, but not one flees from 
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it” (5.46–8; 762). He goes on to condemn the aggrandizing tendencies 
of rulers in both republics and principalities that lead them to attempt 
to enlarge their states. Various political thinkers, both before and after 
Machiavelli, have attempted to account for the destructive tendencies 
of rulers. Hayek, who prefaces a chapter entitled “How the Worst Get 
on Top” with Lord Acton’s famous dictum on the corrupting influence 
of power, argued that collectivist or totalitarian systems offer special 
opportunities for the ruthless and unscrupulous to attain power (2007, 
157–70). The Hungarian political theorist Anthony de Jasay has broad-
ened Hayek’s argument by removing the personality of rulers from 
the equation and treating the state as an actor. Positing that since it 
is in the nature of the state to seek to maximize its power, he predicts 
that “by relentlessly expanding the collective at the expense of the 
private sphere the state-as-drudge always strives to become the state-
as-totalitarian-master” (1998, xii). In outlining the steps leading from 
a “minimal state” with self-imposed limits to a “plantation state” with 
complete mastery over civil society, De Jasay argues, moreover, that 
“there is in competitive, democratic politics, always a latent propen-
sity for totalitarian transformation” (1998, 273). 
Recognizing these tendencies, American libertarian authors have 
long been sounding the alarm that the United States has traveled quite 
far down the road to statism, combining elements of left-wing socialism 
and right-wing fascism (see Rockwell 2013, especially “The Reality of 
American Fascism,” 1–49). Similarly, against any complacent assump-
tion that participatory politics can guarantee a free state, Machiavelli 
warns about the tendency of any regime, regardless of its form, to take 
ever more power unto itself as it takes freedom away from the ruled:
Almost all men, deceived by the false semblance of good 
and the false semblance of renown, allow themselves either 
willfully or ignorantly to slip into the ranks of those who 
deserve blame rather than praise; and, when they might 
have founded a republic or a kingdom to their immortal 
honor, turn their thoughts to tyranny (Discourses 1.10, 88). 
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In conclusion, Machiavelli has often been considered by politi-
cians and political scientists as the proponent of a wide range of po-
litical ideas relevant to the respective reader’s contemporary context. 
Fascist dictator Benito Mussolini opened his “Preludio al Principe” as-
serting the text’s usefulness to modern statesmen and the timeliness 
of its political system (1929, 473). The neoconservative Michael Ledeen 
echoes this view in his 1999 book, Machiavelli on Modern Leadership: Why 
Machiavelli’s Iron Rules Are as Timely and Important Today as Five Centuries 
Ago.27 At the same time, approaching Machiavelli from the other side 
of the ideological spectrum, scholars associated with the “Cambridge 
School” of intellectual history have downplayed or dismissed those as-
pects of his work most appealing to totalitarians in order to celebrate 
the Florentine chancellor as an early proponent of modern-day North 
Atlantic republicanism. Most recently, McCormick has presented a 
more radically democratic Machiavelli whose endorsement of plebian 
tribunes in ancient Rome could serve as inspiration for institutional 
reforms mandating the inclusion of nonwealthy citizens in govern-
ment today. Diverse as these interpretations are, each finds concrete, 
sometimes indisputable evidence in Machiavelli’s works to support a 
particular vision of governance. And given Machiavelli’s attention to 
political states in their various manifestations through time and space, 
seeking a greater understanding of his ideas on this subject is a logical 
undertaking. 
At the same time, however, this focus on the state as protago-
nist tends to obscure instances in which political power, regardless of 
its form, is viewed and judged by Machiavelli as the ultimate antago-
nist pitted against the positive value of personal liberty. Llewellyn H. 
Rockwell, Jr., has spelled out the opposing perspectives in this way: 
There are two, and only two, versions of the story of liberty 
and power. One looks to power, as manifested in the state, 
as the source of progress, prosperity, and order. The oth-
er credits liberty with these good things, along with com-
merce, invention, prosperity, the arts and sciences, the con-
quering of disease and destitution, and much else (2013b). 
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Since most scholars seem to concentrate on how Machiavelli looks to 
power, my intention has been to show what happens when we switch the 
focus to liberty. By drawing attention to moments in which Machiavelli 
can be observed attempting to curb the power of government rather 
than advocating one form over another, we can better understand his 
sage warnings about the tendencies of all political states toward corrup-
tion and the extreme difficulty in safeguarding personal liberty both in 
his time and in our own.
NOTES
1. The writing on the topic of Machiavelli and republicanism by J. G. E. 
Pocock, Quentin Skinner, and other authors affiliated with the 
“Cambridge School” of the history of political thought, is vast. Bock, 
Skinner, and Viroli (1993) and Rahe (2006) offer a representative range 
of essays.
2. As Colish explains: “There are circumstances under which Machiavelli 
thinks that virtually any kind of political arrangement, from tyranny 
to principality to aristocracy to popular rule to factions, can be detri-
mental to liberty. At the same time, there are circumstances under 
which all of these arrangements, with the exception of tyranny, are 
conducive to liberty. Free governments, thus, may take a variety of 
forms. Their parity lies not in their constitutional similarity, but in 
their objectives, their animating principles, their procedures, and the 
advantages they hold out to their citizens” (1971, 345).
3. Skinner appraises various theories of liberty (e.g., Bentham, Berlin, 
Taylor) with respect to Machiavelli, but he does not address Rothbard’s 
writing on the subject (1993, 293–309). McCormick, linking liberty 
to class-specific institutions promoting class consciousness, argues 
primarily against Pettit’s formulation of liberty as nondomination 
(2011, 145–69).
4. His stated contrast is between cities instituted either by “natives of 
the place” or by “people from elsewhere,” but his explanation and 
examples indicate that the distinction is between agreement and 
aggression. His contemporary, Francesco Guicciardini, remarks, less 
idealistically, that “all states, if one carefully considers their origin, 
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are violent” (Ricordi, #95). Rothbard agrees with Guicciardini: “Every 
political State where the facts are available originated by a process of 
violence, conquest, and exploitation” (1982, 229).
5. Whereas in the above passage the original Venetians were simply 
said to be governing themselves through laws, it might be noted that 
when Machiavelli returns to this general model in 1.2, the people have 
hypothetically wished into existence either a republic or a principal-
ity: “I propose to dispense with a discussion of cities which from the 
outset have been subject to another power, and shall speak only of 
those which have from the outset been far removed from any kind of 
external servitude, but, instead, have from the start been governed in 
accordance with their wishes, whether as republics or principalities” 
(Discourses 1.2, 105).
6. During the August 30, 1512, sack of Prato in which 4,000 people were 
slaughtered, “the Spaniards literally chopped the Florentines to pieces 
as they begged for mercy” (Viroli 2000, 129). Medici supporters in 
Florence immediately thereafter forced a regime change, rendered 
official through a Medici coup on September 16 (see Viroli 2000, 
132–3).
7. Prior to his arrest, Machiavelli was also subjected to a lengthy inves-
tigation on the false charge of embezzlement, but “no evidence of 
malfeasance was found. Even though vast amounts of money had 
f lowed through his hands, Niccolò had served the Republic with 
complete and impeccable honesty” (Viroli 2000, 135).
8. “Given the existence of States . . . , are there any moral principles that 
libertarianism can direct as criteria for foreign [and domestic] policy? 
The answer is . . . to reduce the degree of coercion exercised by States 
over individual persons as much as possible” (Rothbard 1982, 189).
9. Machiavelli already gives evidence of seeking the lesser evil in his 
two written communications to the Medici prior to his dismissal in 
which he advocates moderation and clemency (see Viroli 2000, 134–5). 
McCormick (2011) has argued that both The Prince and The Discourses 
covertly aim to “alleviate the people’s oppression” (2011, 37), but his 
focus is on the “political empowerment of the plebs” (2011, 60). Of 
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course, adopting a “prudent” strategy to deal with princes would not 
have been unique to Machiavelli. In Utopia (first published in 1516), 
Thomas More’s character explains to Rafael Hythloday: 
You must not deliver strange and out-of-the-way speeches to 
people with whom they will carry no weight because they 
are firmly persuaded the other way. Instead, by an indirect 
approach, you must strive and struggle as best you can to 
handle everything tactfully—and thus what you cannot 
turn to good, you may at least make as little bad as possible 
(2002, 35).
10. Princes who, on the contrary, rob from the populace in order to be 
liberal with their cronies find themselves in the reverse situation: 
If you want to sustain a reputation for generosity, therefore, 
you have to be ostentatiously lavish; and a prince acting in 
that fashion will soon squander all his resources, only to be 
forced in the end, if he wants to maintain his reputation, to 
lay excessive burdens on the people, to impose extortionate 
taxes, and to do everything else he can to raise money. This 
will start to make his subjects hate him, and since he will 
have impoverished himself, he will be generally despised 
(The Prince xvi, 51).
11. “Roman private law elaborated, for the first time in the West, the idea 
of property rights as absolute, with each owner having the right to use 
his property as he saw fit” (Rothbard 2006, 22). According to Colish, 
“Machiavelli restores the Roman focus on liberty as the enjoyment of 
private legal rights, a notion present in both the republican and impe-
rial eras of Roman history. With the Romans, he defines liberty as the 
security of the individual and the protection of hearth and home, and 
enshrines the law as the greatest guarantee of liberty, a point not empha-
sized by previous Florentine political writers” (1971, 349). Regarding 
canon law, Rothbard writes that “from the time of [the twelfth-century 
canon lawyer] Huguccio [da Pisa], private property was to be considered 
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a sacrosanct right derived from the natural law. The property of indi-
viduals and communities was, at least in principle, supposed to be free 
from arbitrary invasion on the part of the state” (2006, 38).
12. Nor is Machiavelli implying that it is fine for a prince to kill but not 
steal, since on the contrary he cautions that “if, even so, it proves 
necessary to execute someone, this is to be done only when there is a 
proper justification and a manifest reason for it” (The Prince xvii, 55). 
13. He goes on to say: “Such men are a pest in any republic and in any 
province; but still more pernicious are those who, in addition to the 
aforesaid revenues, have castles under their command and subjects 
who are under their obedience” (Discourses 1.55, 245–6).
14. Rothbard does not argue, of course, that all land rent is illegitimate, 
but distinguishes “feudal rent” from “legitimate rent” based on 
whether the origin of the land title is criminal (1982, 66).
15. The reasoning behind the prohibition is as follows: “Denying people 
liberty and keeping prices artificially high, monopolies were obvi-
ously a form of stealing and could lead to perdition” (Parks 2005, 193).
16. Medici intervention in the economy extended to currency manipu-
lation as well. Lorenzo introduced a new coin (the quattrino bianco), 
which had to be used to pay all customs duties, even though incomes 
continued to be paid in the debased currency (the picciolo). This move 
deceptively increased customs taxes by 25 percent (Parks 2005, 226).
17. Guicciardini explicitly stated that a prince’s involvement in the econ-
omy was tyrannical: “I say that the duke of Ferrara’s interests in busi-
ness are not only shameful but make him a tyrant. For he is usurping 
what belongs to private citizens, not to him. And with that, he sins as 
much against the people as they would sin against him if they were to 
interfere in the affairs of a prince” (Ricordi, #94).
18. In tracing the occurrences of “civil” and “civility” in Machiavelli, 
Tenenti finds positive connotations related to general living in society, 
order, codes, customs, and, more broadly, civilization (1987, 119–36).
19. The Fraser Institute of Canada, for example, by measuring “the rela-
tive security of property rights and the viability of contracts across 
countries,” finds that “the more stable property rights are, the stron-
ger a nation’s economy will be” (DiLorenzo 2004, 25).
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20. Machiavelli notes that military preparation is useful not only for 
defensive but also aggressive warfare, yet the recurring focus of The 
Prince is on the need for defense in Italy’s current situation of enslave-
ment. Even the famous maxim that a prince must know how to act 
like a lion and a fox is explained in terms of defense: “one must be a 
fox in order to recognize traps, and a lion to frighten off wolves” (The 
Prince xviii, 57).
21. One may think he has sufficiently made his point, yet he repeats it 
again in the chapter’s closing statement: “So, all things considered, 
I commend those who erect fortresses and those who do not; and I 
censure anyone who, putting his trust in fortresses, does not mind if 
he is hated by the people” (The Prince xx, 71).
22. As Martines goes on to point out, “The professionalization and busi-
ness of war in fourteenth-century Italy helped greatly to ensure the 
survival of signories” (1988, 108).
23. “The law is the means of instituting libertà; it is also the bastion of 
the citizens against arbitrary government, narrow partisan interests, 
violent breaches of the peace, and internecine strife. Hence the crucial 
importance for Machiavelli of buoni ordini and of the well-ordered state, 
which he so often associates with libertà, and which can manifest itself 
in a wide number of governmental forms” (Colish 1971, 347).
24. The motivation, of course, is self-interested: “For the lower the degree 
of taxation, the more productive the subject population will be, and 
the more productive the population, the higher the value of the ruler’s 
parasitic monopoly of expropriation will be” (Hoppe 2001, 19).
25. Hoppe lists additional negative consequences as well, such as “the 
destruction of the gold standard, unparalleled paper-money inflation, 
and increased protectionism and migration controls” (2001, 42).
26. Faced with an ongoing cycle of inevitable degeneration and regime 
change, Machiavelli proposes the simultaneous existence of all three 
imperfect forms, each keeping a vigilant eye on the others (Discourses 
1.2, 109).
27. In his essay “The Truth about Neoconservatism,” Ron Paul provides 
the intellectual and political context for Ledeen’s military interven-
tionism. Citing the conclusion from Ledeen’s more recent publica-
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tion that “They [that is, foreign countries] must attack us in order to 
survive, just as we must destroy them to advance our historic mission,” 
Paul remarks: “If those words don’t scare you, nothing will” (2003).
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